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Who knows what tomorrow brings? Of uncertainty in times of a pandemic. 
 
Pierre Schammo* 
The aim of this contribution is to reflect on an underlying aspect of the pandemic: that is, uncertainty 
affecting policy makers and regulators. I am, of course, not the first who attempts to draw attention to 
uncertainty in relation to the pandemic. Horst Eidenmüller in his recent contribution on the 
desirability of regulatory competition also pointed to the ‘huge information deficit’ that societies were 
facing, and Luca Enriques recently wrote on uncertainty in his work on pandemic resistant corporate 
law.1 
Uncertainty is a vague concept. It can have different states. Donald Rumsfeld famously captured this 
point when differentiating between what he called known-unknowns—‘we know there are some 
things we do not know’ and unknown-unknowns, which describe a state of complete ignorance: we 
simply don’t know what we don’t know.2 The important point is (following Keynes and Knight)3 that 
uncertainty is different from risk. Risk is supposed to be measurable (good enough data allows 
assigning probabilities to future events); uncertainty is not. Hence, uncertainty will be a problem for 
anyone that must take a view of the future when making decisions.4 
John Kay and Mervyn King recently observed that the occurrence of a global pandemic was a known-
unknown.5 It was likely at some point, but they ask ‘what was the probability that coronavirus would 
break out in Wuhan in December 2019?’ They point out that there is just no sensible answer to such a 
question. Importantly, now that the pandemic is in full swing, uncertainty has not suddenly vanished. 
It is all around. It is in this environment that decision-makers must make decisions that a few months 
ago seemed remote or even unthinkable. Think of social distancing, decided at the highest political 
level. Think also of the many recent interventions of financial regulators or central banks in markets. 
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The fact that decision-makers operate in an environment clouded with uncertainty was driven home 
by the FCA in its business plan for 2020/21. It noted:  
‘[t]he magnitude and duration of the economic shock resulting from coronavirus is highly 
uncertain. … The new features of the pandemic, and of the environment in which it occurs, lead 
to an untested and largely unpredictable impact on confidence and investor/consumer 
behaviours. This shock is not like previous economic downturns, but nor will it follow the 
pattern of a natural catastrophe, where the damage can be sized relatively quickly. Here, there is 
enormous uncertainty about the size and nature of potential damage’.6 
It is against this backdrop of heightened uncertainty that an academic debate on financial regulation 
should take place. One paradigm that is often given attention in the context of a discussion of 
uncertainty, especially where coupled with the prospect of irreversible losses, is the precautionary 
principle. Essentially, the idea is that where an activity threatens to cause irreversible damage, but 
there is no scientific certainty, precautionary action might be warranted. Covid-19 has started to 
generate interest in the precautionary principle. Some have turned to it in order to assess the actions or 
inactions of policymakers. Taleb and Bar-Yam, for example, chastise the UK’s initial herd immunity 
approach which they describe as ‘nothing more than a dressed-up version of the “just do nothing” 
approach’ and note that when faced with uncertainty, ‘both governance and precaution require us to 
hedge for the worst’.7 Meanwhile, Greenhalgh and her co-authors, writing in the British Medical 
Journal, turn to the precautionary principle in order to argue that policy-makers should recommend 
the wearing of face masks by the public in the UK.8 Likewise, calls to improve resilience by building 
redundancy in response to supply chain frailties,9 can be understood as an application of the 
precautionary principle. 
That said, the precautionary principle has its critics. Among them is Cass Sunstein.10 Sunstein has 
long been a supporter of quantitative cost-benefit analysis and a sceptic of the added-value of a 
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precautionary principle. For Sunstein, a major problem with the precautionary principle is that it is 
‘paralysing’:11 it can forbid both action and inaction since both can give rise to risks. 
What has this brief discussion yielded so far? First, uncertainty is a major problem for decision-
makers, including financial/banking regulators. Second, a precautionary approach might have a raison 
d’être in the face of (unmeasurable) uncertainty and where there is real prospect of irreversible losses. 
From this, I draw two conclusions. The first is about acknowledging uncertainty and the absence of 
‘business-as-usual’ parameters when putting forward proposals on how to respond to the pandemic 
and its consequences for the economy and financial markets. At a time where much is unknown, it 
seems sensible that the debate should be redirected towards a more careful appraisal of the role of 
uncertainty when considering responses to the current crisis. Consider in this context, the contribution 
of Chiu, Kokkinis and Miglionico on financial regulation suspensions.12 They argue that decisions 
about suspensions should not take place outside a proper framework, but be justified ‘within the key 
tenets of existing institutions’. Hence, they seek, inter alia, to make the most of cost-benefit analysis 
notwithstanding a lack of dependable numbers. This is perceptive work. But what would have 
deserved a fuller discussion is the impact of uncertainty on this framework (although to be fair, 
problematising uncertainty would have required more space than a blog post can offer). The second 
conclusion is tentative and will require more work. Recall that the need to build resilience in the 
financial system was a major lesson of the financial crisis. As noted, it can be expected that as the 
world emerges from the pandemic, one of the lessons will be that it is an imperative in other sectors 
too. A precautionary principle will support such thinking. However, the elephant in the room is 
whether the precautionary principle has something to offer to financial/banking regulators. To be sure, 
in the wake of the great financial crisis, some have argued that financial regulators should apply a 
precautionary principle.13 This was essentially a call for regulators to take a pro-active approach to 
regulation. The current crisis is different. The question that arises is whether under current conditions, 
a precautionary principle has something to offer when financial/banking regulators consider 
interventions in markets. Prima facie, there are reasons to be sceptical.14 One difficulty is (building on 
Sunstein’s work) that it is not clear what a precautionary principle would actually yield, especially if 
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the aim is to avoid irreversible costs. Would it support interventions (including, financial regulation 
suspensions, financial action, etc.) or would it caution against swift actions? Both action and inaction 
can prima facie give rise to irreversible costs (e.g. to the economy or financial stability). The jury is 
out. But should we therefore stop the debate? Clearly not. As the corona crisis unfolds and subsides 
and as we seek to learn lessons for the future, there is room for a richer debate about uncertainty and 
in this context whether and, if so, how to give flesh to a precautionary principle. 
